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A DAY OF RECKONING IS NEAR: RICO, TREBLE
DAMAGES, AND SECURITIES FRAUD*
Fraudulent purchase or sale of securities is unlawful under the federal
securities laws,' exposing a defendant to civil and criminal liabil-
* While this Note was at press, the Second Circuit handed down a series of three panel
decisions issued on consecutive days narrowing the scope of the civil remedy provisions of RICO.
See Sedima v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3495 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 1985) (No. 84-648); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984); Furman
v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984). In an attempt to put a stop to what the Second Circuit
characterized as the "extraordinary, if not outrageous" use of civil RICO by plaintiffs, divided
panels of the court in the three cases required the plaintiffs to allege a "racketeering injury"
in order to sustain a RICO claim. The three decisions appear to signal a rejection by the Second
Circuit of dicta from Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., discussed herein, in which the Second Cir-
cuit previously had argued for a broad reading of civil RICO.
Following Sedima, Bankers Trust, and Furman, however, the Seventh Circuit in Haroco
Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago reiterated its earlier pronouncements
in Schacht v. Brown, also discussed herein, and rejected the Second Circuit's recent restrictive
interpretation of RICO as inconsistent with the deliberately broad reach of the provisions of
the statute. See 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3496 (U.S. Jan.
14, 1985) (No. 84-822). The Haroco court characterized the Second Circuit's definition of
"racketeering injury" as an "amalgamation" of standing limitations on RICO contrary to
the plain language of the statute. The conflict between the Second and Seventh Circuits over
the standing requirements of RICO, therefore, presaged the granting of certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court in Sedima and Haroco to define the proper scope of RICO in the
civil context. This Note takes the position that Congress and not the courts should decide
whether to limit RICO.-Ed.
1. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o (1982); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1982); Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to 80a-52 (1982); Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 17 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982); Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78aaa-78111 (1982). These six acts form the basis of federal statutory regulation of securities.
See Long, Treble Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis
and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REv. 201, 201 n.1 (1981).
Congress intended the securities laws to protect the public through full disclosure of financial
and other information concerning the sale and purchase of securities. See SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963) (securities laws attempt to substitute philosophy
of full disclosure for philosophy of caveat emptor); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
2 & 9-10 (1933) (same); H.R. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933) (same). The purpose
of affirmative disclosure in securities transactions is to prevent fraud in the purchase and sale
of securities. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74,
74 (1933).
Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and §§ 10(b) and 15(c) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act) contain the principal antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982) (prohibiting fraud in offer or
sale of securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting
manipulative or deceptive practices in offering or selling securities); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. 78o(c) (1982) (proscribing broker or dealer fraud). Congress empowered
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce §§ 10(b) and 15(c) of the '34 Act
through appropriate rules and regulations. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 4, 10(b),
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ity." An injured plaintiff alleging securities fraud traditionally has attempted
to infer a private right of action under various provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933 ('33 Act) or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act). A
victim of securities fraud, however, also may have an express private right
of action under the provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
I
15(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d, 78j(b), 78o(c) (1982) (establishing and empowering SEC to formulate
rules and regulations); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.15cl-2 (1983) (Rules lOb-5 and 15cl-2).
2. See Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (providing private right of
action for damages due to false registration statement); Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771 (1982) (providing private right of action for damages in connection with false prospectus
or oral communication); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982)
(providing private right of action for recovery of profits). Congress empowered the SEC to, en-
force by injunction or other means violations of the '33 and '34 Acts. See Securities Act of 1933,
§ 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1982) (providing SEC with power to enjoin violations of '33 Act); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982) (providing SEC with power to enjoin
violations of '34 Act); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1982) (providing
SEC with power to suspend or revoke membership in securities exchange). In addition to civil
penalties, the securities laws include criminal penalties of five years in prison or fines of up to
$10,000 for violations of the provisions of the '33 and '34 Acts. See Securities Act of 1933, §
24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982).
See generally, III L. Loss, SacuarrrEs REGULATION 1683 (2d ed. 1961) (discussing express liability
provisions under federal securities laws); Note, Application of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act (RICO) to Securities Violations, 8 J. CORP. L. 411 (1983) (same) [hereinafter
cited as Application of RICO].
3. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982) (proscribing fraudulent
conduct under '33 Act); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982)
(proscribing fraudulent conduct under '34 Act); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c), 15
U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1982) (proscribing broker or dealer fraud). The antifraud measures of the '33
and '34 Acts do not contain express liability provisions. See L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1683.
Since the 1960s, however, many courts routinely have implied rights of action under § 10(b) of
the '34 Act. See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1967)
(noting spectacular growth of private civil actions under § 10(b)); see also Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (inferring right of action under § 10(b) despite
lack of express civil remedy under § 10(b)). But see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (explaining that Supreme Court never expressly has held that implied
right of action exists under § 10(b)).
The Supreme Court in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak held that implied rights of action under
the securities laws provide a necessary supplement to the enforcement powers of the SEC. See
377 U.S. 426, 430-32 (1963) (upholding private right of action under § 14(a) of '34 Act); see
also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982) (proscribing solicitation
of proxies in contravention of SEC rules and regulations). In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, however, the Supreme Court limited private rights of action under § 10(b) to purchasers
or sellers in privity with the issuer. 421 U.S. 723, 745-55 (1975). The Blue Chip Stamps Court
implicitly left open the possibility that future decisions from the Court might further limit the
application of § 10(b) private rights of action. See id. at 737 & 752 n.15 (emphasizing Supreme
Court's prerogative to define scope of § 10(b) in absence of legislative intent). In Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, the Supreme Court determined that Congress' refusal
to curtail implied rights of action under § 10(b) suggests Congress' acquiescence in judicial inter-
pretations of § 10(b). 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1846 n.92 (1982). The Supreme Court in Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston expressly rejected an attempt to limit implied remedies under § 10(b) to claims
not otherwise actionable under other provisions of the '33 and '34 Acts. 103 S. Ct. 683, 690 (1983).
1090
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Organizations Act (RICO).4 RICO generally attempts to eradicate organized
crime by proscribing the activities of defendants who engage in acts of racketeer-
ing to operate or take control of business enterprises. 5 In addition to criminal
sanctions,6 RICO provides civil remedies to a private plaintiff for injuries to
his business or property caused by a RICO violation.7 Under the civil remedies
section of RICO (civil RICO), an injured plaintiff may recover in federal court
treble damages and attorneys' fees.' A RICO plaintiff generally must show
that a person has invested in, controlled, or conducted an enterprise through
a pattern of racketeering activity to prevail in a civil RICO action. 9 RICO
defines the requisite pattern of activity as consisting of at least two violations
of enumerated federal or state crimes occurring within a ten-year period. 10
4. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) generally prohibits a person
from investing in, controlling, or conducting an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
See id. § 1962. Congress defined racketeering activity as including violations of enumerated state
and federal laws. See id. § 1961(1) (listing violations of state and federal law constituting racketeering
activity); id. § 1961(5) (defining pattern as two or more acts of racketeering within ten-year period);
id; § 1962 (proscribing conduct in connection with pattern of racketeering activity). Congress
intended RICO to eliminate organized criminal activity. See Organized Crime Control Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of Organized
Crime Control Act to help eradicate organized crime in United States).
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982); see supra note 4 (discussion of RICO).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) (criminal penalties of RICO). RICO provides for fines
of up to $25,000, imprisonment of up to 20 years, and forfeiture of all gains from RICO viola-
tions. Id. § 1963(a).
7. See id. § 1964 (civil remedies of RICO). The Justice Department may enforce RICO
by seeking divestment, injunctions, dissolution, and restraining orders. Id. § 1964(a)-(b). A private
plaintiff successfully maintaining a cause of action under RICO for injuries to a plaintiff's business
or property may recover treble damages and attorneys' fees. Id. § 1964(c).
8. See id. § 1964 (1982). Section 1964 (civil RICO) enumerates the civil remedies available
to a RICO plaintiff. Id. Section 1964(c) provides a private right of action for treble damages
and attorneys' fees. Id. § 1964(c). Other civil remedies under RICO include either a private action
or an action by the Attorney General for divestment, a restraining order, or dissolution. Id. §
1964(a)-(b); cf. id. § 1963 (criminal penalties for RICO violations).
9. See id. § 1961(3) (defining person as including any individual or other legal entity as
well as an informal group of individuals); id. § 1962(a) (prohibiting investment in enterprise through
pattern of racketeering activity); id. 1962(b) (prohibiting control of enterprise through patteni
of racketeering activity); id. § 1962(c) (prohibiting conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeer-
ing activity); id. § 1961(5) (defining pattern); id. § 1961(1) (defining racketeering activity).
10. See id. §§ 1961(1), (5). Section 1961(1) of RICO lists 25 federal and 8 state crimes
as acts of racketeering. Id. § 1961(1). The state crimes include murder, gambling, bribery, extor-
tion, and other offenses punishable by imprisonment for at least one year. Id. § 1961(1)(A).
Federal acts of racketeering include violations of various provisions of Title 18 of the United
States Code. Id. § 1961(1)(B); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1341, 1343, 1503 & 1952 (1982) (relating
to bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, and racketeering). Section 1961 lists
any offense under Title 29, dealing with labor unions, as an act of racketeering, as well as any
offense involving bankruptcy fraud under Title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or felonious
trafficking in narcotics, punishable under federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(C)-(D) (1982); see
29 U.S.C. §§186, 501(c) (1982) (relating to payments and loans to labor unions and embezzlement
of union funds).
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Among the enumerated criminal acts of racketeering is fraud in the sale of
securities which is punishable under federal law." RICO, therefore, offers
a plaintiff alleging securities fraud an express statutory remedy. 2
Although Congress enacted RICO as part of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970,1" private plaintiffs increasingly are seeking to use RICO as
a remedy for securities violations.' 4 A plaintiff alleging ordinary securities fraud
may maintain an action under civil RICO against investment firms and other
corporate defendants who have no apparent connection with organized crime."5
Moreover, recent decisions indicate that federal courts are unwilling to limit
the scope of civil RICO to organized crime.' 6 Courts' liberal interpretation
of RICO exposes corporate defendants to possible RICO penalties for securities
violations.' RICO's remedial provisions, including treble damages and at-
torneys' fees, therefore, provide incentives for plaintiffs routinely to allege
RICO violations in actions involving securities fraud. 8
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982).
12. See infra notes 99, 155-159 and accompanying text (broad language of RICO allows
courts to apply RICO in context of securities fraud). See generally Application of RICO, supra
note 2.
13. See Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat.
922, 941-47 (1970) (RICO is Title IX of Organized Crime Control Act's twelve titles). Congress
sought through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970(OCCA) to strengthen evidence-gathering
tools, establish new penal prohibitions, and provide enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
achieve the eradication of organized crime. Id. § 1; see S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
2 (1969). The first seven titles of OCCA address the problems that confront the government
in obtaining evidence of organized crime. See OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923-26
(1970). The evidence-gathering tools include use of a special grand jury, new immunity provisions
for witnesses, sanctions against recalcitrant witnesses, revised perjury provisions, protected facilities
for government witnesses, special deposition procedures, and various rules for litigation concern-
ing sources of evidence. See id. Titles VIII, X, and XI of OCCA contain new penal prohibitions.
See id. at 937-40 (proscribing activities of syndicated gambling business); id. at 948-52 (providing
enhanced sentences for repeat offenders); id. at 952-60 (regulating interstate commerce in explosives).
Title XII provides for the establishment of a temporary National Commission on Individual Rights
to monitor government practices relating to special grand juries, wiretapping, bail reform, preventive
detention, search warrants, and federal data banks. See id. at 960-61. Title IX (RICO) expressly
provides severe criminal sanctions and treble damage recovery for private plaintiffs. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1963-1964 (1982); see supra notes 6-7 (discussing RICO's remedial provisions).
14. See Application of RICO, supra note 2, at 412 (broad language of RICO allows plain-
tiffs bringing securities fraud claims under RICO to satisfy easily the definitional prerequisites
of RICO); Skinner & Tone, Civil RICO and the Corporation Defendant, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 30,
1984, at 22, col. 1 (noting recent deluge of private RICO actions).
15. See Skinner & Tone, supra note 14, at 22, col. 1 (defendants with no connection to
organized crime are primary focus of civil RICO actions); Skinner & Tone, Recent Developments
in RICO Litigation, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 13, 1984, at 20, col. 1 (plaintiffs increasingly are using
RICO in lieu of traditional civil remedies for corporate fraud).
16. See infra notes 32-35 & 43-57 and accompanying text (discussing majority view that
nexus with organized crime is not required for plaintiff to recovery under civil RICO).
17. See infra notes 12-35, 43-57, 67-69, 71-80, 85-91, 95-97, 111-114, 133-143 & 151-152
(discussion of cases that liberally construe RICO); see also OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title
IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970) (Congress mandated that courts liberally construe RICO
to effectuate RICO's remedial purposes).
18. See Morrison, Old Bottle-Not So New Wine: Treble Damages in Actions Under Federal
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The language of RICO proscribing racketeering activity in connection with
an enterprise emerged primarily because Congress wanted to provide a bold,
new approach to the problems of organized crime.' 9 During the 1950s, Con-
gress first recognized that existing sanctions and remedies to combat organized
crime were limited in scope and impact."0 The passage of RICO in 1970
Securities Laws, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 67, 68 (1982) (lure of RICO's treble damages and attorneys'
fees provisions will increase frequency of allegations of RICO violations in securities fraud cases).
19. See OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (Congress passed RICO
to provide more severe sanctions and new remedies to combat activities of organized crime);
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 79 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan, principal sponsor
of OCCA). See generally, Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg, 58 NoTm DAME L. REv. 237 (1982) (discussion of legislative history of RICO).
20. See OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970); see also S. REP. No.
141, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 33 (1951) (organized crime uses profits of racketeering to buy and
operate legitimate business enterprises). Beginning in 1950, Sen. Estes Kefauver's Committee to
Investigate Organized Crime attempted to expose the activities of the underworld. See S. REP.
No. 307, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 170-81 (1951) (underhanded methods of organized crime and enormous
accumulation of wealth account for infiltration of organized crime into American society). In
1955, Sen. John McClellan and Robert Kennedy initiated a systematic investigation of racketeer-
ing. See A. SCHIMsNGER, ROBERT KENNEDY AND His Tmms 115 & 137-91 (1978) (documenting
Robert Kennedy's experiences as chief counsel for Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate
Government Operations Committee); see also R. KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WrrmN 229 (1960)
(gangsters are highly organized, are more powerful than at any time in history of country, and
continue to grow stronger). In 1957, Sen. McClellan and Chief Counsel Kennedy conducted extensive
hearings before the newly created Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor
or Management Field. See S. RP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). The Senate Select
Committee, or Rackets Committee, heard testimony from hundreds of witnesses and found that
existing methods were not adequate to combat organized crime. See id.; see also R. KENNEDY,
supra, at 253 (arguing that attack on organized crime requires new weapons and techniques);
J. McCtauLAN, Cnm Wrr TT PuNisim:aiTr 11 & 251-57 (1962) (need for legislation exists since
statutes are not strong or specific enough to combat organized crime successfully).
Prior to the passage of RICO, the government used the law of conspiracy to prosecute
organized criminal activity. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TaMP. L.Q. 1009, 1010 n.4 (1980).
Conspiracy, however, was difficult to prove in the context of organized crime because members
of organized crime were able to insulate themselves from prosecution by diversifying their activity
and by using the fruits of criminal activity in legitimate businesses. See Blumenthal v. United
States, 332 U.S. 539, 549 & 557-59 (1947) (conspiracy theory requires plaintiff to show evidence
of scheme or common objective of members, identity of members of scheme, members' connec-
tion with scheme, and members' knowledge of scheme's general scope); United States v. Elliott,
571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir.) (pre-RICO conspiracy law allowed organized crime to avoid prosecu-
tion by diversifying criminal activity, thereby thwarting attempts by prosecutors to prove com-
mon objective of conspiracy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
Notwithstanding the difficulties in prosecuting organized crime prior to the passage of OCCA,
Robert Kennedy, Attorney General in the Kennedy Administration, put pressure on the federal
government to prosecute those who had been exposed during the course of the Rackets Commit-
tee's investigation of organized crime. See A. ScHLESINGER, supra at 285. Thus, under the Kennedy
Administration, convictions of racketeers by the Organized Crime Section and the Tax Division
of the Justice Department increased from 96 in 1961 and 101 in 1962 to 373 in 1963. Id. at
278; see 115 CONG. Rac. S5883-84 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1969).
Prosecutorial zeal, however, was not adequate in the fight against organized crime since
the remedies and sanctions available to the government were limited to fines and imprisonment.
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represented an attempt by Congress to reverse the perceived trend of growing
infiltration of organized crime into American society.2 The drafters of the
legislation sought to make RICO broad and flexible enough to apply to the
various ways in which organized crime operates. 2 Congress believed that the
best way to attack organized crime was to destroy the economic base of
organized crime through criminal penalties and civil remedies. 23
Before a private plaintiff can recover treble damages and attorneys' fees
under section 1964 of RICO, 2 a plaintiff must show a violation of section
1962 which sets forth the conduct proscribed by RICO. 25 A plaintiff bringing
a RICO claim usually alleges that the defendant violated section 1962(c) by
conducting or participating in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity. 26 Under section 1962 of RICO, a plaintiff first must show that the
See J. McCLELLAN, supra, at 251-57 (new legislation, in addition to vigorous Justice Department,
needed to curtail activities of organized crime); see also S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
78-79 (1969) (traditional approaches to organized crime do not deal effectively with organized
crime's economic power). In 1965, President Johnson appointed a National Crime Commission
to explain why the efforts aimed at eliminating organized crime had been ineffective. See Blakey
& Gettings, supra, at 1015 nn.24-25. See generally PREsmaNT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADM. OF JusTicE, TaE C LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY (1967) [hereinafter cited
asPRESIDENT'S Comt'N]. The Commission recommended new legislation to thwart organized
crime's infiltration of legitimate business through severe criminal sanctions and civil treble damage
remedies patterned after the antitrust laws. See PasEErr's COMM'N, supra, at 190. The Com-
mission's findings prompted Sen. McClellan in 1969 to introduce the Organized Crime Control
Act. See 115 CONG. REc. S5877 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
21. See S. REp. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 76-83 (1969) (organized crime's infiltration
of legitimate business threatens free enterprise).
22. See McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil
Liberties?, 46 NoTRE DAME LAw. 55, 142-43 (1970) (Congress purposefully designed RICO to
apply to variety of criminal offenses characteristic of organized crime).
23. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1982) (providing criminal penalties and civil remedies for
viblations of RICO); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan)
(claiming that RICO represents frontal attack on subversion of economic system by organized
crime). RICO's criminal forfeiture and 20-year imprisonment provisions seek to remove members
of organized crime from control of legitimate businesses and to destroy organized crime's economic
power resulting from the benefits of criminal activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982); see also
OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970) (Congress noted that organized
crime derives power from enormous amount of money illegally obtained); S. RP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969) (same). RICO's treble damages provision gives private plaintiffs an
opportunity to help destroy the economic base of organized crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982);
supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing civil remedies and criminal penalties).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (RICO provision for civil remedies including treble damages
and attorneys' fees).
25. Id. § 1962. Subsection (a) of § 1962 proscribes investment of income in an enterprise
by a person who has participated in a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982).
Subsection (b) makes -it unlawful to acquire through a pattern of racketeering activity an interest
in or control of an enterprise. Id. § 1962(b). Subsection (c) makes it unlawful to conduct or
participate in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. § 1962(c). Finally, subsec-
tion (d) prohibits conspiracy to violate subsection (a), (b), or (c). Id. § 1962(d).
26. See id. § 1962(c). A plaintiff bringing a RICO claim, particularly one involving securities
fraud, typically alleges a violation of § 1962(c). See Application of RICO, supra note 2, at 416
(subsection (c) is broadest provision of § 1962).
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defendant is a person as defined in section 1961 .27 Section 1961 defines a per-
son as either an individual or a legal entity. 8 The express language of RICO,
therefore, does not require a plaintiff to show that the defendant is connected
with organized crime.29
Notwithstanding the express language of section 1961 requiring a RICO
plaintiff to show only that the defendant is a person, defendants frequently
argue that RICO is not applicable to defendants who are not members of
organized crime. 31 In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. I' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently considered whether to limit civil
RICO to members of organized crime.2 The defendant stockbroker in Moss
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982). RICO defines person to include any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. §§ 1961-1968 (statute is silent on whether RICO defendant must be member
of organized crime).
30. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting defen-
dant's argument that language of RICO premises RICO violation on proof of defendant's ties
to organized crime), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984) (No. 83-950); Schacht
v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Nov.
29, 1983) (No. 83-548); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1982) (rejecting defen-
dants' argument that RICO does not extend outside context of organized crime), aff'd on reh'g
in part and rev'd and remanded on reh'g in part, 710 F.2d 1361 (1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3440 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1983) (No. 83-587).
Consistent with the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits' refusal to accept defendants'
arguments that courts should limit RICO to defendants connected with organized crime, a majority
of United States district courts deciding the issue similarly have held that the express language
of RICO does not require a plaintiff to allege an organized crime nexus. See, e.g., In re Longhorn
Sec. Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255, 269 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (RICO does not require that plaintiff
establish connection between defendant and organized crime); In re Action Indus. Tender Offer,
572 F. Supp. 846, 851 (E.D. Va. 1983) (same); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667,
682 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (same); Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp.
667, 670 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (same); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 490-93 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (noting majority view that courts should not limit RICO to organized crime); Crocker Nat'l
Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (Congress did not limit
RICO to persons connected with organized crime); Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources
Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SeC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,742, p. 93,737 (N.D. Ohio June
11, 1982) (unnecessary for plaintiff to allege that defendant is member of organized crime);
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, p. 92,214 (D. Mass. Nov. 17,
1981) (same); see also infra notes 32-35 & 43-57 (discussion of cases supporting majority view
that organized crime nexus is not prerequisite to recovery under civil RICO). But see Hokama
v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (accepting defendants' argument
that plaintiff must allege some connection between defendant and organized crime); Adair v.
Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same); Bar v. WUI/TAS,
Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same); infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing minority view cases requiring plaintiff to allege organized crime nexus).
31. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984) (No.
83-590).
32. Id. at 21. In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., the Second Circuit considered whether
RICO is applicable to ordinary securities fraud under § 10(b) of the '34 Act. Id.; see also Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (prohibiting manipulative or deceptive practices
in offering or selling of securities). The Moss court disagreed with the district court that RICO
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allegedly received confidential information of an imminent tender offer and
subsequently purchased shares in a target company in violation of section
10(b) of the '34 Act.33 The defendant claimed that RICO only proscribes
conduct relating to criminal racketeering and therefore does not encompass
acts of securities fraud committed by a defendant who has no connection
with organized crime .3 Although noting decisions from United States district
courts requiring a plaintiff to allege an organized crime nexus, the Second
Circuit in Moss held that the plain language of RICO does not premise a
RICO violation on proof of a defendant's connection with organized crime.3
Courts in the Southern District of New York, including the district court
in Moss," previously had held that a plaintiff could maintain a RICO ac-
tion only if some nexus existed between the defendant and organized crime.
3 7
These courts reasoned that Congress intended RICO to apply only in the
context of organized crime despite the lack of specific references to
organized crime within the statute. 38 For example, in Barr v. WUI/TAS,
does not encompass private actions for violations of securities statutes by ordinary businesses.
719 F.2d at 21; see Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
The Second Circuit concluded that the district court misinterpreted RICO since the language of
the statute does not premise a RICO claim on proof of allegations of a defendant's ties to organized
crime. 719 F.2d at 21. See generally Note, Civil RICO: The Temptations and Impropriety of
Judicial Restriction, 95 HAv. L. Rsv. 1101 (1982) (arguing that in the absence of statutory language
limiting RICO to organized crime, courts exceed limits of judicial discretion when courts decide
not to allow plaintiff to proceed under RICO because defendant is not member of organized
crime) [hereinafter cited as Impropriety of Judicial Restriction].
33. 719 F.2d at 8.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id.; see infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (discussing cases cited in Moss requir-
ing plaintiff to allege organized crime nexus).
36. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 719
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984) (No. 83-950).
37. See Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dismissing plain-
tiffs' RICO claim because defendants were not within scope of statute dealing with organized
crime's control of business enterprises); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (RICO defendants must be members of organized crime).
38. See Moss, 553 F. Supp. at 1361 (courts should limit RICO strictly to organized crime);
Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (same). In Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
Inc., the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York argued that Con-
gress' failure expressly to limit RICO to organized crime does not imply that Congress intended
to prevent courts from exercising discretion to filter out RICO claims alleging ordinary business
fraud. See 553 F. Supp. at 1359-61. In support of a restrictive interpretation of the statute, the
district court in Moss noted that the legislative history of RICO does not indicate that Congress
intended RICO to apply outside the context of organized crime. Id. at 1361. The district court,
however, did not provide any specific references to the legislative history. See id.; cf. S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1969) (RICO proscribes activity characteristic of organized
crime); McClellan, supra note 22, at 142-43 (notwithstanding criticisms of RICO that statute
would apply outside context of organized crime, Congress drafted RICO broadly to apply to
variety of offenses characteristic of organized crime). In Barr v. WUIITAS, Inc., the court similarly
held that RICO is not applicable outside the context of organized crime since the legislative history
makes frequent reference to racketeers and organized crime. 66 F.R.D. at 113. The district courts
in Moss and Barr, however, appear to have based their holdings on the legislative history instead
of the language of the statute. See 553 F. Supp. at 1361; 66 F.R.D. at 113; cf. 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1982) (statute is silent on whether RICO defendant must be member of organized
1096
RICO AND SECURITIES FRAUD
Inc. 39 one of the first cases to analyze the pleading requirements of a civil
RICO claim, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York considered whether RICO was applicable to a defendant who had
no apparent connection with organized crime. 40 The Barr court dismissed
a RICO claim involving mail fraud because the defendant was not a member
of organized crime.4' Relying on the Barr decision, a number of other United
States district courts subsequently held that RICO is applicable only within
the context of organized crime.
4 1
crime). See generally Blakey, supra note 19, at 285 (criticizing district courts that limit RICO
to organized crime for redrafting rather than reading RICO); Long, supra note 1, at p. 209 (Barr
court misconstrued RICO). The Second Circuit in Moss overturned the district court's holding
requiring that a plaintiff allege a connection between the defendant and organized crime and
thus effectively overruled Barr. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983)
(notwithstanding Barr decision, language of RICO does not premise violation on proof of defen-
dant's ties to organized crime), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984) (No. 83-590).
39. 66 F.R.D. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
40. Id. at 113. In Barrv. WU1/TAS, Inc., the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add a RICO count
in addition to a Sherman Act claim based upon an alleged scheme to mail overstated bills for
telephone answering service charges. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1982) (listing federal mail
fraud as act of racketeering); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (federal mail fraud statute). The
Barr court determined that the defendant, a telephone answering service business, was a legitimate
business organization and therefore was not subject to a statute directed against the activities
of organized crime. 66 F.R.D. at 113; see supra note 38 (explaining Barr holding limiting RICO
to defendants who are members of organized crime).
41. 66 F.R.D. at 113.
42. See, e.g., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(despite language of RICO providing plaintiff with cause of action in securities fraud case, plain-
tiff must allege some connection with organized crime since Congress intended RICO to eradicate
organized crime); Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 218 (D. Colo. 1983) (RICO is not applicable
to plaintiff alleging securities fraud who has sufficient remedies under federal and state securities
laws); City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., No. 81-106A (N.D. Ga. Aug. 20, 1981) (available
on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file) (limiting RICO to defendants involved with organized
crime); Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La.
1981) (Congress did not design civil remedies provisions of RICO to convert every fraud action
into treble damage RICO action); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48
(N.D. Il. 1981) (plaintiff can maintain RICO claim only by showing defendant's ties to organized
crime).
In Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that the legislative history of the statute clearly reveals
that RICO should apply only to actions involving the activities of organized crime. 527 F. Supp.
at 260. The Waterman court's interpretation of RICO's legislative history is questionable. Cf.
id. (broad application of RICO would contravene clear intent of Congress not to allow statute
to operate outside context of organized crime). Congress' purpose in passing RICO unquestionably
was to combat organized crime. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1969) (RICO
represents attack on economic base of organized crime). Congress recognized that a new approach
was necessary to eradicate organized crime. Id. at 78; see supra note 20 (discussing Congress'
recognition of inadequacies of pre-RICO sanctions and remedies). Congress, however, opted for
a statutory scheme sufficiently broad in scope to deal with the problems of organized crime.
See McClellan, supra note 22, at 60-61 (attacking criticisms of OCCA that statute would operate
outside context of organized crime). Senator McClellan noted the difficulty of drafting a statute
broadly enough to include the activities characteristic of organized crime without also subjecting
ordinary defendants to the provisions of the statute. See McClellan, supra note 22, at 61.
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Prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Moss, courts in the Southern
District of New York had begun to attack the Barr holding that required a
plaintiff to show the defendant's connection with organized crime as a prere-
quisite to recovery under civil RICO. 3 In Mauriber v. Shearson/American
Express," the Southern District of New York denied the defendants' motion
to dismiss the plaintiff's RICO claim for failure to allege that the defendants
were affiliated with organized crime." The Mauriber court found that both
the plain language and the legislative history of RICO clearly establish that
Congress intentionally declined to limit RICO's scope to defendants with
organized crime connections.16 In Mauriber, the court noted that Senator John
McClellan, the principal sponsor of the Organized Crime Control Act, was
aware that a statute drawn broadly enough to reach the activities of organized
crime necessarily would include offenses committed by persons outside the
context of organized crime.4 7 Moreover, the court cited legislative history in-
dicating Congress' unwillingness to make RICO violations dependent on
association with a class of persons such as the Mafia since Congress rejected
an amendment to RICO that would have criminalized membership in the Mafia
or La Cosa Nostra.4" The Moss and Mauriber decisions indicate that within
the Second Circuit, RICO is applicable outside the context of organized crime. 4 9
43. See Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (plain language of RICO does not require plaintiff to allege that defendant associated with
organized crime); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same).
44. 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
45. Id. at 1239. In Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York considered the plaintiff's RICO claim involving
fraud in the sale of securities. Id. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to allege that the defendant was affiliated with organized crime. Id. The Mauriber court rejected
the defendant's motion and instead followed the Seventh Circuit's decision in Schacht v. Brown
refusing to limit the class of RICO defendants to members of organized crime. Id. at 1239-40;
see Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1353-54; infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussion of Schacht).
46. See 567 F. Supp. at 1239-40. The Mauriber court cited legislative history indicating
that Congress intentionally declined to limit the reach of the statute to defendants with connec-
tions to organized crime. Id.; see 116 CONG. REc. S18,940 (daily ed. June 9, 1970) (remarks
of Sen. McClellan) (expansive scope of statute is necessary to reach various commercial activities
of organized crime).
47. 567 F. Supp. at 1239; see 116 CoNG. Rac. S18,940 (daily ed. June 9, 1970) (remarks
of Sen. McClellan) (noting difficulties of drafting effective statute against organized crime that
does not subject persons outside organized crime to provisions of statute).
48. See 116 CONG. REc. H35,343 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1970) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi). Several
congressmen attacked the proposed amendment to RICO that would have limited the statute
to the Mafia and La Cosa Nostra. See id. at H35,343-44 (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("Mafia"
and "La Cosa Nostra" are imprecise and uncertain terms); id. at H35,344 (remarks of Rep.
Poff) (proposed amendment might violate Supreme Court's rulings striking down statutes creating
status offenses); see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660-67 (1962) (statutes that define
status as criminal offense are unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment under eight and
fourteenth amendments); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 225 (1961) (criminalizing mere
membership in organization engaged in illegal conduct is unconstitutional under due process clause
of fifth amendment).
49. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 21; Mauriber, 567 F. Supp. at 1239; see also supra notes 32-35
& 45-48 (discussion of Moss and Mauriber).
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Consistent with the Second Circuit's decision in Moss rejecting a require-
ment that a plaintiff allege an organized crime nexus, the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Bledsoe5 held that RICO does not require proof that a defen-
dant is engaged in organized crime. 5' The Bledsoe court noted that one of
Congress' purposes in passing RICO was to avoid problems of proof that
would be enormously difficult for a private plaintiff to meet.2 The Bledsoe
court concluded, therefore, that Congress sought to avoid imposing upon a
plaintiff the burden of proving a defendant's connection with something as
vaguely defined as organized crime.. 3 In determining that RICO operates out-
side the context of organized crime, the Seventh Circuit in Schacht v. Brown5"
similarly underscored legislative history indicating Congress' awareness of the
broad reach of RICO's provisions. 5 Although the Seventh Circuit conceded
that Congress may have created a "treble damage bonanza," the Schacht court
nevertheless held that civil RICO is applicable in ordinary business fraud cases.5 6
Notwithstanding courts' sympathy with attempts by defendants to limit the
scope of RICO, the United States circuit courts that have addressed the ques-
tion have refused to require a plaintiff to allege a nexus between the defen-
dant and organized crime.7
50. 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 456 (1982).
51. Id. at 663. In United States v. Bledsoe, the Eighth Circuit considered whether a scheme
involving fraudulent sales of securities in agricultural cooperatives was actionable under § 1962(c)
of RICO. Id. at 651; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). The Bledsoe court held that Congress did
not intend to require a plaintiff to allege that the defendant engaged in the activities of organized
crime. 674 F.2d at 663. The Eighth Circuit emphasized that while RICO's focus is on organized
crime, the statute uses an approach that does not confine the reach of the statute to participants
in organized crime. Id.; see McClellan, supra note 22, at 142-43 (Congress did not claim that
members of organized crime primarily commit offenses listed as acts of racketeering but that
these offenses are characteristic of organized crime); see also United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d
1127, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977) (legislative intent was to make RICO violations dependent upon behavior
not status).
52. 674 F.2d at 663; see United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (8th Cir.) (Congress
passed RICO to obviate necessity of proving conspiracy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); Im-
propriety of Judicial Restriction, supra note 32, at 1108 & n.45 (Congress passed RICO to remedy
problems in obtaining evidence against organized crime).
53. 674 F.2d at 663.
54. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1983)
(No. 83-548).
55. Id. at 1353 & 1361. The Seventh Circuit in Schacht v. Brown considered the defen-
dants' argument that RICO's civil provisions are not applicable in ordinary business fraud cases.
Id. at 1353. In rejecting the defendants' contention, the Schacht court noted that Congress de-
signed RICO broadly so that the statute would reach the various activities of organized crime.
Id. The Seventh Circuit refused to adopt a narrow interpretation of RICO in deference to the
legislature's purpose and intent in passing RICO. Id. at 1357. The Schacht court suggested that
courts are without authority to curtail the application of RICO's provisions. Id. at 1353. Accord-
ing to the Seventh Circuit, if the legislature had not wanted RICO to apply to business fraud
cases, the legislature would not have included securities or mail fraud among the acts of racketeering
enumerated in § 1961. Id. at 1356; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(I)(D) (1982).
56. 711 F.2d at 1361.
57. See supra notes 33-35 & 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing cases holding that
organized crime nexus is not prerequisite to recovery under RICO).
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Courts' refusal to narrow the scope of RICO to organized crime has
prompted corporate defendants to look for other ways to limit RICO's scope."
Corporate defendants frequently argue that courts should not apply RICO
when the alleged acts of racketeering consist of ordinary securities fraud viola-
tions since adequate remedies for fraud already exist under federal securities
laws. 9 Notwithstanding defendants' interpretation of racketeering activity,
Congress placed few restrictions on the types of securities violations that con-
stitute acts of racketeering." Although Congress apparently intended to exclude
common-law fraud and violations of state securities laws from the requisite
acts of racketeering, Congress declined to include references to specific provi-
sions of the federal securities laws. 61 According to the express language of
58. See supra notes 33-35 & 43-57 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which defen-
dants unsuccessfully argue for restrictive interpretation of language of RICO to prevent in-
discriminate application of RICO's sanctions).
59. See, e.g., Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1353 (defendant unsuccessfully argued that broad reading
of RICO in context of securities fraud would eclipse federal securities laws); In re Action Indus.
Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Va. 1983) (court noted that effective remedies for
plaintiff alleging securities fraud already exist under federal securities laws but nevertheless re-
jected defendant's argument that RICO required plaintiff to allege organized crime nexus); Noland
v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 218 (D. Colo. 1983) (court accepted defendants' contention that
sufficient remedies were available to plaintiff under federal securities laws and thus dismissed
plaintiff's RICO claim).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1982) (acts of racketeering include any offense involving
federal securities fraud).
61. See id. (RICO applies to any securities fraud that is punishable under laws of United
States). Subsection (1)(D) of § 1961 lists three acts of racketeering, including fraud under title
11 of the United States Code, securities fraud, and felonious trafficking in narcotics. Id. The
original version of RICO omitted an express reference to title 11, merely listing bankruptcy fraud
as an act of racketeering. See OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, title IX, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 922, 922
(1970). In 1978, the Bankruptcy Reform Act amended RICO to substitute fraud under title 11
for bankruptcy fraud in the list of racketeering activities. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, title III, § 314(g), 92 Stat. 2549, 2677 (1978). In RICO's present form, subsection
(1)(D) is ambiguous since RICO now proscribes fraud under title 11, securities fraud, and felonious
trafficking in narcotics, punishable under federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1982). The
phrase, "punishable under any law of the United States," may be interpreted to refer only to
the final act in the series, felonious trafficking in narcotics, rather than to each of the three
acts of racketeering. See id. Interpreting the phrase to modify each act in the series would result
in redundancy because the first act listed would have two phrases qualifying bankruptcy fraud
as punishable by federal law. See id. ("any offense involving fraud... under title 11 ... punishable
under any law of the United States. . . .") Since no redundancy existed in the original version,
Congress probably intended the final phrase to modify each act listed in § 1961(l)(D). See OCCA,
Pub. L. No. 91-452, title IX, § 910(a), 84 Stat. 922, 922 (1970). The confusion created by the
statute is merely the result of poor drafting of the amendment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982);
Moss, 719 F.2d at 18-19 n.14 (reserving issue of whether RICO encompasses common-law fraud
under § 1961(1)D)). Most commentators and courts have interpreted the language of § 1961(1)(D)
to mean federal securities fraud. See Trane v. O'Connor Sec., No. 1519, slip op. at 6545 (2d
Cir. Sept. 19, 1983) (interpreting racketeering activity under § 1961 to include securities fraud
punishable under federal law); Furman v. Cirrito, No. 4428, slip op. at - (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
6, 1984) (same); Long, supra note 1, at 205 (same); Blakey, supra note 19, at 307 n.172 (RICO
requires plaintiffs to show more than common law fraud).
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the statute, therefore, any offense involving securities fraud under federal law
constitutes an act of racketeering, or predicate act, for purposes of establishing
a pattern of racketeering activity.
62
RICO defendants also have encountered difficulty in showing that the
plaintiff has failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity. 63 The language
of RICO requires only that a plaintiff prove the defendant's commission of
two or more acts of racketeering within a ten-year period. 6 4 Since fraud in
the sale of securities is an act of racketeering, a plaintiff can satisfy RICO's
pattern requirement by showing two or more securities fraud violations within
ten years. 6 For example, in Spencer Companies, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car,
Inc.,66 the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held
that the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of fraudulent
schedules and amendments constituted a pattern of racketeering activity since
each filing constituted a single act of racketeering. 67 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Weatherspoon61 held that a defendant who used
the mails five times in furtherance of one scheme to defraud the plaintiff was
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982). The legislative history of RICO includes only passing
references to securities fraud. See OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 82 Stat. 922, 923 (organized
crime harms innocent investors); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1969) (organized
crime has penetrated securities firms and stock exchanges). During hearings on RICO before
the House Judiciary Committee, the New York City Bar Association criticized the inclusion of
securities fraud as an act of racketeering, arguing that securities fraud was not characteristic
of organized crime. See Relating to the Control of Organized Crime in the United States: Hear-
ings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 401 (1970) (securities fraud is not synonymous with racketeering activity).
Notwithstanding the New York City Bar's position, however, Congress enacted § 1961(1)(D) listing
securities fraud as a predicate offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982).
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (RICO defines pattern of racketeering activity as at
least two acts of racketeering within a ten-year period).
64. See id.
65. See id. §§ 1961(1)(D) & 1961(5). Each securities violation constitutes a single act of
racketeering. Id. § 1961(1)(D); see also S. RaP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (each
criminal violation of enumerated acts of racketeering is equivalent to one act of racketeering
for purposes of satisfying pattern requirement of RICO).
66. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RP. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).
67. Id. at 92,215. In Spencer Companies, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts considered whether individual incidents
of one scheme to defraud can constitute acts of racketeering. Id. at -. The defendants in
Spencer allegedly engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by filing with the SEC a series
of misleading Schedules 13D relating to the purchase of equity securities and subsequent amend-
ments to induce plaintiff to purchase defendants' securities. Id. at _; see Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, § 13(d), 18 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982); Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1983)
(explaining SEC's filing requirement for Schedule 13D); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 9(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1982) (violation of § 13(d) is actionable under § 9(a), which
proscribes manipulation of price of security to induce purchase of security). The Spencer court
held that each fraudulent filing of a Schedule 13D and any subsequent amendments constituted
one act of racketeering, and thus the scheme to defraud amounted to a pattern of racketeering
activity. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RP. (CCH) at p. 92,215.
68. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
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subject to liability under RICO since each instance of mail fraud constituted
a predicate act of racketeering.69
Defendants also argue that RICO requires a plaintiff to show a connec-
tion in time or in character between the acts of racketeering as a prerequisite
to satisfying the pattern of racketeering activity requirement."0 The Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Computer Sciences Corporation71 considered whether
a predicate offense committed almost ten years prior to a second predicate
offense could combine with the second offense to meet the pattern require-
ment of RICO. 712 The Computer Sciences court rejected the defendants' inter-
pretation of RICO requiring the plaintiff to show a connection between the
acts of racketeering and instead held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a
pattern of racketeering activity under RICO since the acts of racketeering
occurred within ten years of each other.73 The Computer Sciences court rea-
soned that RICO contains no requirement of relatedness in time or in character
between the predicate acts of racketeering other than the ten-year provision.7,
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Elliott7" also refused to impose a require-
ment of interrelatedness in character between the predicate acts of racketeer-
ing in addition to the statutory time requirement. 7' The Elliott court noted
that Congress imposed only the requirement that a defendant commit two
acts of racketeering within a ten-year period. 7 Moreover, according to the
Elliott court, Congress expressly indicated that one of the purposes of RICO
69. Id. at 602. In United States v. Weatherspoon, the defendant argued that one scheme
of five instances of mail fraud constituted only one act of racketeering activity under RICO.
Id. at 601. The Seventh Circuit disagreed and held that the plain language of the statute did
not require two schemes of racketeering to constitute the requisite pattern of activity. Id. at 601-602.
The Weatherspoon court determined that the statute allows each act of mail fraud to combine
with other similar acts of one scheme to defraud to satisfy the pattern of racketeering activity
requirement. Id. at 602; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1982) (federal mail fraud is act of racketeer-
ing); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982) (federal mail fraud statute).
70. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (two acts of racketeering within ten years constitute
pattern of racketeering activity).
71. 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 729 (1983).
72. Id. at 1189. In United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., the defendant allegedly engaged
in mail fraud nearly ten years before conducting a scheme to overbill the General Services
Administration for computer services. Id. at 1183-84. The Fourth Circuit held that the remoteness
of the predicate acts of racketeering did not warrant a dismissal of the RICO action unless the
predicate acts occurred more than ten years apart. Id. at 1190; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982)
plaintiff can satisfy pattern of racketeering activity requirement merely by showing occurrence
of two acts of racketeering within ten years).
73. 689 F.2d at 1190.
74. Id.
75. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
76. Id. at 899 n.23. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Elliott considered whether RICO
applied to a scheme involving a number of diverse acts including arson, car theft, murder, and
sale of narcotics. Id. at 899. The Elliott court held that the activities of the loosely connected
criminal network constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
77. Id. at 899 n.23; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (definition of pattern does not require
interrelation of acts of racketeering).
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was to attack the diversified activities of organized crime. 78 Consequently, the
Fifth Circuit declined to read a further requirement of relatedness between
the different types of acts of racketeering because Congress intended RICO to
reach the diverse ways in which organized crime operates.7 Since the express
language of the statute does not require a showing of relatedness between the
acts of racketeering to satisfy the requisite pattern of racketeering activity,
a majority of federal courts after Elliott have decided whether a pattern exists
solely on the basis of the requisite number of acts within the ten-year time
frame without a discussion of the relationship in time or in character between
the acts of racketeering.8"
In addition to proving a pattern of racketeering activity, a plaintiff also
must prove the existence of an enterprise.8 Under the definitional section of
RICO, an enterprise includes any individual, corporation, or other legal entity,
as well as a group of individuals not comprising a formal legal entity.82 Despite
the apparently unambiguous definition of an enterprise within the statute, the
enterprise requirement has been the subject of much litigation. 3 In United
States v. Turkette,84 the Supreme Court considered the meaning and scope
of the RICO enterprise requirement.8 5 In Turkette, the alleged enterprise con-
sisted of a group of individuals who together engaged in various criminal acts
constituting racketeering activity under RICO. 6 The defendant in Turkette
argued that RICO was applicable only when the enterprise constituted a
legitimate enterprise rather than an exclusively criminal or illegitimate
enterprise.8 7 In support of the view that a RICO enterprise does not encom-
pass illegitimate entities, the defendant in Turkette cited legislative history of
78. 571 F.2d at 899; see OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 922 (1970). (Con-
gress aimed RICO at diversified activities of organized crime).
79. 571 F.2d at 899 n.23.
80. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1983) (two acts of §
10(b) fraud under '34 Act satisfy pattern of racketeering activity requirement), cert denied, 52
U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984) (No. 83-590); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304
(7th Cir. 1979) (two instances of state crime of robbery satisfy pattern of racketeering activity
requirement), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). See generally Long, supra note 1, at 217 & n.115
(citing cases following Elliott holding that RICO does require showing of relatedness between
predicate acts to satisfy requisite pattern).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) (enterprise includes any individual or other legal entity
as well as informal groups of individuals not comprising legal entity).
82. Id.
83. See Application ofRICO, supra note 2, at 417-26 (explaining courts' treatment of RICO
enterprise requirement).
84. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
85. Id. at 579. In United States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court reversed a First Circuit
ruling that RICO applies only to legitimate enterprises. Id. at 580. The defendant in Turkette
allegedly conducted an enterprise in acts of felonious trafficking in narcotics, arson, mail fraud,
bribery, and obstruction of justice. Id. at 579. The activities of the alleged criminal enterprise
constituted acts of racketeering under § 1961 of RICO. Id. at 579 & n.3; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A)-
(C) (1982) (listing acts of racketeering activity).
86. 452 U.S. at 579.
87. Id. at 579-80.
19841 1103
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1089
RICO indicating that one of the major purposes of the statute was to prevent
the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime."8 The Turkette
Court, however, refused to exclude association with a criminal enterprise from
the reach of the statute since RICO contains no express language limiting RICO
to the infiltration of legitimate enterprises.89 Moreover, the Turkette Court
emphasized that any attempt to limit the scope of RICO to legitimate enter-
prises would be contrary to Congress' mandate that courts liberally construe
RICO's provisions.9" The Turkette Court, therefore, interpreted the enterprise
requirement to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. 9
Since an enterprise can include not only a legitimate business but also
a criminal organization or enterprise, an enterprise may comprise the associa-
tion of a broker who fraudulently sells securities and the investment firm that
employs him. 92 Such an illegitimate enterprise consists of a legitimate entity,
the investment firm, and the broker's illegitimate scheme of racketeering
activity. 93 A corporate defendant, therefore, potentially is liable for treble
damages under RICO even though he may be involved only remotely with
the securities fraud. 94 For example, in Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.,9- the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan considered whether the association of a broker and two brokerage
firms constituted an enterprise within the meaning of RICO. 96 In denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to allege the existence of an enter-
prise, the Austin court relied on Turkette to find that Congress did not intend
to confine RICO to the infiltration of legitimate businesses.9"
88. Id. at 591-93 & nn.13-14; see 116 CONG. REc. S591 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1970) (remarks
of Sen. McClellan) (goal of RICO is removal of organized crime from control of legitimate
organizations).
89. Id. at 581.
90. Id. at 587; see OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, title IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 946 (1970)
(Congress directed courts to construe liberally RICO's provisions).
91. 452 U.S. at 584-85.
92. See id. at 584-85 & 590. In Turkette, the Supreme Court rejected a narrow interpreta-
tion of the scope of the RICO enterprise, holding instead that RICO applies both to legitimate
and illegitimate enterprises. Id. at 584-85. The Turkette Court held that RICO does not require
a plaintiff to prove that the defendant infiltrated the plaintiff's legitimate business. Id. at 590.
See generally Application of RICO, supra note 2, at 419 (explaining that Turkette has had far-
reaching implications in securities fraud context).
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) (definition of RICO enterprise includes any association
of individuals, even if group is not legal entity).
94. See id. §§ 1961(4), 1962(c), 1964(c) (defendant's association with an enterprise engaged
in racketeering activity exposes defendant to treble damages under civil RICO).
95. 570 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
96. Id. at 669. In Austin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the United States
District Court for the Western District of Michigan considered whether the plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged an enterprise consisting of a broker and two brokerage firms who associated together
to induce the plaintiffs to trade in high-risk stock options. Id. at 668-69 & n.2. The Austin court
held that the association of defendants to defraud the plaintiffs constituted an enterprise. Id.
at 669 n.2; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) (defining enterprise).
97. 570 F. Supp. at 669; see Turkette, 452 U.S. at 590 (rejecting narrow interpretation
of enterprise requirement).
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Notwithstanding the apparent applicability of RICO to ordinary securities
fraud claims after Turkette, a number of federal courts have gone beyond
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the enterprise requirement to impose
a requirement that the enterprise exist separately from the predicate acts of
racketeering.98 In Bennett v. Berg,99 the Eighth Circuit reasoned that under
RICO, an enterprise cannot be merely the equivalent of the scheme to commit
acts of racketeering.' According to the Eighth Circuit in Bennett, Congress
did not intend RICO to provide enhanced remedies for racketeering activity
when adequate remedies already exist under the enumerated state and federal
laws comprising acts of racketeering.' The Bennett court reasoned that RICO
does not proscribe conduct constituting a violation of one of the enumerated
acts of racketeering activity.0 2 RICO instead prohibits a defendant from in-
vesting in, acquiring an interest in, or conducting the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.0 3 The Eighth Circuit, therefore,
focused on the scope of the enterprise requirement, requiring proof that the
enterprise have an ascertainable structure distinct from the conduct constituting
the pattern of racketeering activity.' In support of a narrow interpretation
98. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982) (RICO does not provide enhanced
remedies for acts of racketeering already cognizable under other state and federal statutes); United
States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 663-64 (8th Cir. 1982) (RICO does not proscribe the activities
of informal groups engaged in acts of racketeering); In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F.
Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Va. 1983) (plaintiff's allegations of two or more acts of federal securities
fraud is not necessarily sufficient to maintain RICO action since effective remedies for acts of
racketeering already exist under federal law). See generally Comment, Reading the "Enterprise"
Element Back Into RICO: Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L. Rav. 100 (1981) (courts that
uphold existence of enterprise based upon proof of association to commit racketeering activity
have made enterprise requirement superfluous).
99. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
100. Id. at 1060-61 & n. 10. In Bennett v. Berg, the alleged enterprise consisted of a corpora-
tion that owned and operated a retirement community. Id. at 1056 & 1060. The defendants, who
were officers, directors, and other individuals and organizations associated with the retirement
community, allegedly engaged in a scheme of mail fraud that misled the plaintiffs concerning
the financial soundness of the community. Id. at 1056-57. The acts of mail fraud apparently
induced the plaintiffs to pay a substantial endowment fee in exchange for promises of care for
an entire lifetime. Id. The defendants argued for dismissal on grounds that the plaintiffs failed
to show the existence of an enterprise separate from the pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at
1059. The district court characterized the alleged enterprise as pervasively fraudulent and thus
without existence apart from the pattern of racketeering activity. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Ben-
nett disagreed and held that the retirement community constituted an enterprise because the retire-
ment community provided various services indicating the existence of a structure separate from
the acts of mail fraud. Id. The Bennett court, however, emphasized that a RICO enterprise must
have an existence apart from the pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 1060. Under the Bennett
court's interpretation of Turkette, the legality or illegality of the enterprise's activities is irrele-
vant. Id.; see Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 (enterprise is separate element from pattern of racketeer-
ing activity).
101. 685 F.2d at 1060.
102. Id. at 1061 n.10.
103. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962(c) (1982) (requiring plaintiff to prove existence of'
enterprise in addition to pattern of racketeering activity).
104. 685 F.2d at 1060.
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of the enterprise requirement to prevent indiscriminate application of RICO's
sanctions outside the context of organized crime, the Bennett court cited the
Supreme Court's opinion in Turkette for the general proposition that proof
of an enterprise cannot consist merely of the proof offered to satisfy the pat-
tern of racketeering activity requirement.' 5 In Turkette, the Court held that
a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO is not the equivalent of an enter-
prise, whether legitimate or illegitimate.'0 The Turkette Court explained that
the plaintiff must prove the existence of both the enterprise and the pattern
of racketeering activity.0 7 The Bennett court, however, cited specific language
from Turkette suggesting that the enterprise exists separately from the pattern
of racketeering activity."0 8 The Bennett court, therefore, concluded that the
enterprise must have a discrete economic existence apart from the pattern of
racketeering activity.0 9
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the enterprise
requirement in Bennett, the Second Circuit in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,"'
held that the enterprise may be identical to the pattern of racketeering activity."'
In Moss, the plaintiff alleged that a RICO enterprise consisted of a group
of employees of investment firms and a broker who committed securities
violations."2 The Moss court admitted that the enterprise essentially was the
105. Id. at 1064 & n.17 (RICO does not convert every fraud claim into RICO cause of action
since plaintiff must prove existence of enterprise); see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
583 (1981) (plaintiff must prove existence of enterprise separate from pattern of racketeering activity).
106. 452 U.S. at 583.
107. Id.
108. 685 F.2d at 1060; see 452 U.S. at 583 (enterprise is separate element from pattern of
racketeering activity).
109. 685 F.2d at 1060.
110. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984) (No.
83-590).
111. Id. at 22. Like the Eighth Circuit in Bennett v. Berg, the Second Circuit in Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, Inc. considered language from Turkette concerning the proper scope of the RICO
enterprise. See id.; see also 452 U.S. at 583 (emphasizing necessity of proving existence of enter-
prise as prerequisite to recovery under RICO). The district court dismissed the plaintiff's RICO
claim because the plaintiff failed both to allege an organized crime nexus and to demonstrate
the existence of an enterprise distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity. Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1358-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's RICO claim because the plaintiff failed to prove securities
fraud under § 10(b) of the '34 Act. 719 F.2d at 18-19; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). In interpreting § 10(b), the Second Circuit followed the Supreme
court's decision in Chiarella v. United States and held that the defendant broker had no duty
to the plaintiff to disclose the confidential information concerning the imminent tender offer.
719 F.2d at 16; see Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 223 (1980) (limiting § 10(b) liability of defendant
to breach of duty of disclosure). In the absence of such a duty, the defendant did not commit
fraud under § 10(b). 719 F.2d at 16. Thus without proof of securities fraud to establish racketeer-
ing activity, the plaintiff's RICO claim failed. Id. at 18-19.
112. 719 F.2d at 22. In Moss, the plaintiff was a former shareholder who had sold his shares
in a target company prior to the public announcement of a tender offer. Id. at 8. An employee
of Morgan Stanley acquired advance knowledge of the imminent tender offer and informed an
employee of a different investment firm as well as a broker. Id. These three individuals allegedly
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equivalent of the scheme of racketeering activity." 3 The Second Circuit
expressly rejected the Eighth Circuit's holding in Bennett and cited language
from Turkette indicating that in some cases the evidence offered to prove the
existence of an enterprise may be the same evidence necessary to show a pattern
of racketeering activity.'1 4 Both the Moss and Bennett couirts emphasized that
Turkette requires a plaintiff to prove the existence of an enterprise." I Unlike
the Eighth Circuit in Bennett, however, the Second Circuit in Moss recogniz-
ed that Turkette left open the possibility that proof of the acts of racketeering
activity also may constitute proof of the enterprise.' 6 The Second Circuit
in Moss held, therefore, that RICO is applicable to situations in which the
enterprise is equivalent to the acts of racketeering.''
7
The Second Circuit's holding in Moss is consistent both with the Supreme
Court's decision in Turkette and with the language of RICO.III While Turkette
requires that a plaintiff prove the existence of both an enterprise and a pat-
tern of racketeering activity, Turkette does not require that the enterprise
necessarily have a discrete existence apart from the pattern of racketeering
activity." 9 Turkette merely emphasizes that the enterprise and the pattern of
racketeering activity are separate elements of a RICO violation. 20 While proof
of a pattern of racketeering activity may not necessarily establish an enter-
prise, evidence of a pattern of racketeering, in particular cases, also may satisfy
the enterprise requirement.''
associated together to purchase shares in the target company and then to resell the shares at
a higher price after the public announcement. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the broker was a
member of an enterprise that engaged in a pattern of securities fraud. Id. at 9; see 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961 (1)(D) & 1962(c) (1982).
113. 719 F.2d at 22; United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 55 (2d Cir. 1983) (RICO applies
when enterprise is equivalent to predicate acts of racketeering), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 133 (1984).
114. 719 F.2d at 22; see Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
115. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 22; Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060; see also Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
116. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 22; see also Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583; cf. Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060.
117. 719 F.2d at 22. In Moss, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the RICO claim but relied on a rationale different from the lower court's rationale. Id. at 20.
The district court had held that the enterprise must have an economic existence discrete from
the pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 22. The Second Circuit, however, held that Turkette does
not mandate that the RICO enterprise be separate from the pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
at 22. The Second Circuit cited language from Turkette indicating that while the enterprise and
the pattern of racketeering activity are separate elements, proof used to establish these elements
may coincide. Id.; see Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. The Second Circuit in Moss, therefore, expressly
rejected the Eighth Circuit's holding in Bennett. 719 F.2d at 22; Bennett, 685 F.2d at 1060; supra
note 100 (discussion of Bennett).
118. See 452 U.S. at 583; 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) (language of RICO does not indicate
that enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity are mutually exclusive terms).
119. See 452 U.S. at 583 (enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity are separate elements
that plaintiff must prove).
120. See id.
121. See id.; see also United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1979) (enterprise
can be equivalent of acts of racketeering activity), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980). But see
United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664 (8th Cir.)(enterprise cannot be equivalent of acts
of racketeering), cert denied, 103 S. Ct. 456 (1982). In United States v. Aleman, the Seventh
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The Second Circuit's broad interpretation of the enterprise requirement
in Moss is more consistent with the express language of RICO than the Eighth
Circuit's reading of the enterprise requirement in Bennett.' 22 The Moss court's
interpretation of RICO also is consistent with RICO's legislative history since
Congress directed courts to construe liberally the provisions of the statute.123
The Supreme Court's reading of the enterprise requirement in Turkette com-
bined with courts' liberal construction of RICO's other def'mitional prerequisites
suggest that RICO extends far enough to include ordinary securities fraud
claims."24
Assuming a plaintiff proves a RICO violation under section 1962, a final
prerequisite to recovery of treble damages and attorneys' fees under section
Circuit upheld the existence of an enterprise that consisted merely of the association of defen-
dants to commit three home robberies. 609 F.2d at 301. Although the enterprise in Aleman lacked
a definite structure apart from the acts of racketeering, the Seventh Circuit refused to reverse
the-defendant's RICO convictions since the state crime of robbery is an act of racketeering under
RICO. Id. at 304; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1982) (robbery punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year is act of racketeering). 609 F.2d at 304; cf. id. at 311 (Swygert, J., dissenting)
(expressing opinion that majority in Aleman misapplied RICO because no enterprise existed apart
from racketeering activity).
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Bledsoe criticized the Aleman court's loose construc-
tion of RICO and held that a group of individuals who allegedly sold securities to defraud the
plaintiff did not constitute an enterprise within the meaning of RICO. 674 F.2d at 662, 664.
According to the Bledsoe court, Congress did not intend to include under RICO informal groups
created to commit acts of racketeering. Id. at 663-64. But see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) (enter-
prise includes group of associated individuals even though group is not legal entity). The Eighth
Circuit that Congress did not design RICO to serve as a recidivist statute, imposing enhanced
sentences for acts of racketeering that already are punishable under other statutes. 674 F.2d at
659, 664; see S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (Congress did not intend that
RICO attack isolated acts of racketeering); 116 CONG. REc. S18,940 (daily ed. June 9, 1970)
(remarks of Sen. McClellan) (RICO requires threat of continuing racketeering activity against
enterprise before remedial provisions of statute are applicable). RICO technically is not a recidivist
statute since criminal conviction of racketeering activity is not a prerequisite to recovery under
RICO. See USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982)
(nothing in plain language of RICO suggests that § 1964(c) is applicable only to defendants already
convicted or charged with criminal racketeering activity); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (creating
private right of action for treble damages and attorneys' fees for violations of § 1962); S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (act of racketeering must be act violating independent
statute subject to criminal prosecution).
122. Compare Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. 719 F.2d 5, 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (RICO does
not require enterprise to have separate existence from pattern of racketeering activity), cert. denied,
52 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984) (No. 83-590) and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) (defining
enterprise to include informal group of individuals) with Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060
(8th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff must allege existence of enterprise apart from acts of racketeering) and
United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664 (8th Cir.) (enterprise must have some structure separate
from racketeering activity), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 456 (1982).
123. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 22 (broadly construing enterprise requirement); OCCA, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, title IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 946 (1970) (Congress mandated that courts liberally
construe RICO).
124. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593 (RICO enterprise includes both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises); Moss, 719 F.2d at 21 (RICO not limited to members of organized crime); Schacht,
711 F.2d at 1353-55 (RICO is applicable in ordinary business fraud cases).
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1964(c) of civil RICO is a showing by the plaintiff that the defendant's viola-
tion of RICO caused an injury to the plaintiff's business or property.'25 The
causation aspect of section 1964(c) has been the focus of some courts' at-
tempts to limit the standing of plaintiffs alleging RICO violations. '26 The
language of section 1964(c) appears to require only that a RICO violation
proximately cause a plaintiff's alleged injuries.' 27 Notwithstanding the language
of RICO, however, defendants have argued that only plaintiffs alleging either
a competitive or a commercial injury have standing to sue under civil RICO.'28
Defendants have interpreted the language of section 1964(c) requiring a plain-
tiff to show injuries to the plaintiff's business or property as a statutory limita-
tion of civil RICO to commercial injuries. 129 Defendants also have asserted
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (providing private right of action to person injured in
business or property "by reason of" violation of § 1962).
126. See, e.g., In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 851-52 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(limiting civil RICO to plaintiff alleging injuries caused by racketeering enterprise and not just
by predicate acts of racketeering); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
(causation aspect of § 1964(c) requires plaintiff to show injury from activities of enterprise in-
stead of from predicate acts of securities fraud); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F.
Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (same); Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. 98,772, p. 93,922-23 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (limiting § 1964(c) to injuries arising from
marketplace activity); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125,
1137 (D. Mass. 1982) (limiting liability under § 1964(c) to business losses from racketeering activi-
ty since violation of § 1962 must cause injury to plaintiff's business or property); Landmark
Savings & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-209 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (limiting § 1964(c)
recovery to racketeering enterprise injury); see also infra notes 128-152 and accompanying text
(discussion of cases interpreting § 1964(c)).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (injuries must be "by reason of" proscribed conduct
under § 1962). See generally Long, supra note 1, at 241-42 ("by reason of" language of § 1962(c)
implies concept of proximate cause).
128. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(limiting § 1964(c) to plaintiffs alleging competitive injury caused by defendant's racketeering
activities); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (limiting § 1964(c) to
commercial injuries); North Barrington Dev., Inc., v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D.
I1. 1980) (limiting § 1964(c) to competitive injuries); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535
F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass. 1982) (limiting § 1964(c) to business losses from racketeering
activity); infra note 129 (discussing Johnsen, Van Schaick, and Bankers Trust). But see infra
notes 131-143 and accompanying text (discussing courts that refuse to limit § 1964(c) to commer-
cial or competitive injuries).
129. See Bankers Trust, 566 F. Supp. at 1241; Johnsen, 551 F. Supp. at 285; Van Schaick,
535 F. Supp. at 1137. In Johnsen v. Rogers, the plaintiffs purchased fractional interests in oil
and gas leaseholds based upon alleged material misrepresentations regarding the potential pro-
ductivity of the leaseholds. 551 F. Supp. at 283. The plaintiffs in Johnsen attempted to recover
under § 1964(c) of RICO, claiming that the defendant sellers of the oil and gas leaseholds par-
ticipated in an enterprise engaged in a scheme of securities fraud. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c),
1964(c) (1982). The Johnsen court held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege a commercial
injury caused by the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.
551 F. Supp. at 285. The court emphasized that § 1964(c) does not provide plaintiffs with an
additional remedy for injuries already compensable under the federal securities laws. Id. The
Johnsen court also interpreted RICO to require allegations of injury resulting from the racketeer-
ing enterprise instead of from the predicate acts of securities fraud. Id.
Notwithstanding the language of the statute requiring injury to a plaintiff's business or prop-
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that civil RICO implicitly requires a plaintiff to show competitive injuries
resulting from defendants' conduct because Congress patterned civil RICO
after the remedial provisions of the antitrust laws relating to the preservation
of competition.' 30
Two circuit courts recently have considered whether Congress intended
section 1964(c) of RICO to remedy only commercial or competitive injuries
caused by a defendant.I3 The Eighth Circuit in Bennett v. Berg 32 considered
erty, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Van Schaick v. Church
of Scientology of Cal., Inc. asserted that courts should confine the applicability of § 1964(c)
to business losses from racketeering injuries. 535 F. Supp. at 1137. In Van Schaick, the corporate
defendant allegedly induced the plaintiff to enter a program of psychotherapy guaranteed to achieve
certain physical, mental, and social benefits. Id. at 1131. The plaintiff apparently sought to recovery
bribery payments that she had made to the defendant after the defendant had threatened to disclose
confidential information about the plaintiff. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(A) (1982) (state crime
of bribery is predicate act of racketeering). Offering no analysis of the facts underlying the plain-
tiff's RICO claim, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for failure to allege a commercial
injury under § 1964(c) of RICO. 535 F. Supp. at 1137.
In Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York attempted to restrict § 1964(c) even further than Van Schaick by requiring a RICO
plaintiff to allege an injury to competition. 566 F. Supp. at 1241. The plaintiff trust company
in Bankers Trust claimed that the defendants concealed assets from the trustee in bankruptcy
in attempting to obtain a discharge of debts. Id. at 1236-38. The court held that the alleged
RICO violation involving bankruptcy fraud did not meet the requirements of § 1964(c). Id. at
1241; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1982) (listing fraud under Title 11 as predicate act of racketeer-
ing). Specifically, the Bankers Trust court found that Congress intended RICO to combat organized
crime's harmful effects on competition. 566 F. Supp. at 1241; see OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452,
§ 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (Congress enacted RICO in part to prevent organized crime from
interfering with free competition). In support of a limitation of civil RICO to competitive in-
juries, the court noted the similarity between the language of § 1964(c) and § 4 of the Clayton
Act. 566 F. Supp. at 1241. Compare 18 U.S.C, § 1964(c) (1982) (providing private right of action
for treble damages and attorneys' fees to plaintiff injured in his business or property due to
RICO violation) with Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (providing private right of action
for treble damages and attorneys' fees to plaintiff injured in his business or property due to
antitrust violation). Since Congress aimed the antitrust laws at anticompetitive practices, the Bankers
Trust court reasoned that civil RICO is applicable only to competitive injuries. 566 F. Supp.
at 1241; see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (interpreting
§ 4 of Clayton Act to compensate only injuries caused by anticompetitive acts).
130. See OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (Congress in part passed
RICO to limit organized crime's effect on free competition); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. 76-81 (1969) (emphasizing organized crime's control over commercial and competitive prac-
tices of nation's free enterprise system); id. at 81 (recommending that Congress adapt civil remedies
developed in antitrust area to problem of organized crime); 115 CoNG. Rac. S6994-95 (daily ed.
Mar. 20, 1969) (report of Antitrust Section of American Bar Association) (endorsing legislative
proposals to use antitrust remedies including treble damages in attempting to eradicate organized
crime).
131. See Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-58 (7th Cir.) (rejecting competitive injury
limitation of RICO since objectives of RICO and antitrust laws are different), cert. denied, 52
U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1983) (No. 83-548); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058-59 (8th
Cir. 1982) (recognizing that Congress borrowed tools of antitrust law to combat organized crime
but rejecting limitation of RICO to antitrust objective of protecting competition); see also infra
notes 133-143 and accompanying text (discussion of Schacht and Bennett courts' consideration
of § 1964(c)).
132. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982).
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the commercial and competitive injury limitations to RICO as one issue since
the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege an injury to property
affecting the plaintiffs' commercial or competitive interests. '33 The Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that an allegation of commercial or competitive injury is not
a prerequisite to recovery under civil RICO.'" The Bennett court cited legislative
history indicating that Congress passed RICO to attack the property interests
of organized crime notwithstanding the type of business or property injury
alleged.'" In determining that restrictive standing requirements applicable in
the antitrust field are not consistent with the business or property language
of RICO, the Eighth Circuit noted that Congress did not intend to limit RICO
to the antitrust goal of preventing interference with free trade.'36 The Seventh
Circuit in Schacht v. Brown'37 considered defendants' argument that civil RICO
applies only to those injured as competitors of the defendants.'38 According
to the defendants in Schacht, Congress patterned section 1964(c) of RICO
after section 4 of the Clayton Act which provides treble damages and attorneys
fees to private plaintiffs who prevail in antitrust actions.'" While conceding
the obvious similarities between section 1964(c) and section 4 of the Clayton
Act, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless held that neither the plain language nor
the legislative history of RICO warrants restricting section 1964(c) to com-
petitive injures.' 40 The Schacht court emphasized that Congress enacted RICO
to attack organized crime and not restraints on competition.'' In support of
the Seventh Circuit's view that RICO is not the equivalent of an amendment
to the antitrust laws, the Schacht court noted that prior to enacting RICO
133. Id. at 1059; see supra notes 100-109 and accompanying text (discussion of Bennett).
In Bennett, the defendants argued that language in § 1964(c) limiting a private right of action
to injuries to a plaintiff's property combined with the similarity between § 1964(c) and § 4 of
the Clayton Act suggest that injury to property under RICO means injury to commercial or com-
petitive interests. 685 F.2d at 1058. The Bennett court rejected a commercial or competitive in-
jury limitation of RICO, interpreting Congress' passage of RICO apart from the Sherman Act
as an implicit rejection of the standing requirements that apply in the antitrust context. Id. at 1059.
134. 685 F.2d at 1059.
135. Id.; see 116 CONG. REc. S602 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (pur-
pose of RICO is to attack property interests of organized crime).
136. 685 F.2d at 1059; see S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82 (1969) (objectives
of RICO are distinct from goals of antitrust laws).
137. 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1983) (No.
83-548).
138. Id. at 1356; see supra note 55 (discussion of Schacht).
139. 711 F.2d at 1356-57; Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
140. 711 F.2d at 1358. The Schacht court argued that the structural similarity between §
1964(c) of RICO and § 4 of the Clayton Act does not necessarily imply that antitrust considera-
tions of market efficiency are applicable in the context of organized crime. Id. In rejecting a
competitive injury limitation of civil RICO, the Seventh Circuit in Schacht concluded that the
policies underlying RICO and the antitrust laws are distinct. Id.
141. Id. at 1358; see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (limiting private action under civil RICO
to plaintiff alleging injury to his business or property caused by RICO violation); OCCA, Pub.
L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (in enacting RICO, Congress noted that organized
crime not only interferes with free competition but also weakens stability of nation's economic
system, harms innocent investors, and undermines general welfare of nation).
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Congress considered but rejected a bill that would have amended the antitrust
laws to cover organized criminal activity.' 42 The Schacht court, therefore, con-
cluded that Congress enacted RICO as a separate tool to combat organized
crime. 143
While analogizing civil RICO to the antitrust laws would seem to be con-
trary to the legislative intent, defendants nevertheless have argued that courts
should limit section 1964 of RICO to racketeering enterprise injuries in the
same way that courts limit section 4 of the Clayton Act to antitrust injuries.'
44
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,' 41 the Supreme Court re-
quired the plaintiffs to prove "antitrust injury" which the Court defined as
the type of injury that Congress intended the antitrust laws to prevent.'" The
Brunswick court noted that Congress aimed the antitrust laws at anticompetitive
practices.' 47 RICO defendants have borrowed the concept of antitrust injury
from Brunswick in attempting to persuade courts to limit RICO, not to com-
petitive injuries as in the antitrust area, but to racketeering enterprise injuries
of the type Congress intended RICO to prevent.'"
142. See 711 F.2d at 1357 & n.16; S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. S17,999
(daily ed. June 29, 1967) (amending antitrust laws to provide private treble damages remedy in
organized crime context). The Senate Judiciary Committee did not report S. 2048 with the Organized
Crime Control Act. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969).
143. 711 F.2d at 1357. Congress enacted RICO apart from the antitrust laws to avoid con-
fusing the goal of eradicating organized crime with the goal of regulating competition. See 115
Cong. Rec. S9567 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan) (maintaining that OCCA
does not import complexities of antitrust law into area of organized crime control); see also 115
CoNG. REc. S6995 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1969) (report of Antitrust Section of American Bar Associa-
tion) (recommending that Congress enact organized crime control legislation as separate statute
from Sherman Act since amending antitrust laws to combat organized crime would create standing
requirements appropriate only in antitrust context).
144. See, e.g., Furman v. Cirrito, No. 82-4428, slip op. at __ (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 1984)
(dismissing plaintiff's RICO claim for failure to allege racketeering enterprise injury analogous
to antitrust injury); In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 852 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(same); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l. Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1006-1008 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
(same); Landmark Savings & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-209 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(same); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (limiting
§ 4 of Clayton Act providing private right of action for treble damage and attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs proving injury to competition, or antitrust injury).
In Landmark Savings & Loan v. Rhoades, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan considered whether § 1964(c) envisions ordinary securities fraud violations.
527 F. Supp. at 207-209. The plaintiff in Landmark alleged that the defendant corporation engaged
in a scheme of churning involving the plaintiff's account for the purpose of earning transaction
commissions. Id. at 207-208. The Landmark court dismissed the plaintiff's RICO claim since
the plaintiff failed to allege a racketeering enterprise injury distinct from an injury based upon
the predicate acts of racketeering. Id. at 208-209. Although the Landmark court did not define
the scope of the racketeering enterprise injury concept, the court indicated that the concept re-
quired proof of an enterprise separate from the acts of racketeering. See id. at 208 (noting that
plaintiff's complaint does not distinguish between enterprise and defendants who engaged in
racketeering activity).
145. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
146. Id. at 489.
147. Id. at 488-89.
148. See In re Longhorn Sec. Litigation, 573 F. Supp. 255, 269-70 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (re-
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Federal courts that have considered the racketeering enterprise injury con-
cept have defined the concept to require proof of injury arising from the rela-
tionship between the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity,
cognizable both under section 1962 and the treble damages provision contained
in section 1964(c), rather than injury arising merely from the predicate offenses
enumerated in section 1961.'1 9 The Eighth Circuit in Bennett recognized that
the racketeering enterprise injury concept essentially is an indirect way of stating
that the enterprise must have a separate existence from the pattern of racketeer-
ing activity.' 0 While declining to address the racketeering enterprise issue,
the Second Circuit in Moss concluded that an overly narrow interpretation
of the enterprise requirement as well as the creation of standing requirements
that preclude application of RICO in many securities fraud cases is inconsis-
tent with both the express language and the legislative history of RICO.' 5 '
Courts property have rejected the commercial, competitive, and racketeering
enterprise injury standing requirements in civil RICO actions since such re-
quirements are inconsistent with the broad scope of the statute.
52
Similarly, courts should reject any attempt to limit RICO by narrowly
interpreting the statute's provisions since Congress directed courts to construe
liberally the language of the statute. ,53 Reading additional standing requirements
into RICO appears to be not only contrary to principles of statutory construc-
tion but also inconsistent with RICO's legislative history indicating that RICO
is applicable outside the context of organized crime.15  Notwithstanding
criticisms of RICO suggesting that the statute turns ordinary securities fraud
claims into treble damage actions, courts should adhere to the strict language
of the statute, particularly when the legislature intentionally cast RICO in
jecting defendant's contention that showing of racketeering enterprise injury is prerequisite to
recovery under § 1964(c) since antitrust laws and RICO serve different purposes); In re Action
Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 851 (E.D. Va. 1983) (accepting defendant's argument
that plaintiff must allege type of injury that Congress designed RICO to prevent).
149. See Furman v. Cirrito, No. 82-4428, slip op. at - (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 1984) (plaintiff
failed to allege racketeering enterprise injury distinct from injury arising out of racketeering activity);
In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 852 (E.D. Va. 1983) (same); see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 & 1964(c) (1982).
150. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982).
151. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 22; supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text (discussion of
Moss court's treatment of enterprise requirement). The Moss court declined to reach the precise
issue of whether § 1964(c) requires a plaintiff to allege racketeering enterprise injury. 719 F.2d
at 20 n.16.
152. See supra notes 128-151 (discussing commercial, competitive, and racketeering enter-
prise injury standing limitations of RICO).
153. See OCCA, Pub. L. No. 91-452, title IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970) (directing
courts to construe broadly RICO's provisions).
154. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)
(unambiguous language of statute is controlling unless clearly contradicted by express legislative
intent), cited with approval in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); see also S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) (RICO applies to activities characteristic of organized
crime); McClellan, supra note 22, at 142-43 (Congress passed RICO notwithstanding criticisms
of RICO that statute extends outside context of organized crime).
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general terms to reach the diverse ways in which organized crime operates.'",
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Turkette emphasized that Congress was well
aware of RICO's broad scope.'- 6 Turkette supports the notion that courts are
without authority to restrict the application of RICO's powerful provisions.' 57
The legislature and not the courts should consider the appropriateness of
limiting the scope of RICO.158 Until Congress decides to limit RICO's scope,
federal courts should follow Turkette, Moss, and Schacht and resist the temp-




155. See McClellan, supra note 22, at 143 (noting difficulty of drafting statute effective against
organized crime that does not also include offenses committed by defendants outside context
of organized crime).
156. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87, 593 (1981).
157. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981); see also Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLuM. L. Rv. 527, 533, 539 (1947) (judiciary should
not go beyond interpreting meaning of language of statute since legislative intent is embedded
in statutory language). But see Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory
Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HLv. L. Rlv. 892, 894 (1982) (criticizing courts for
invoking literal reading of statutory language as surrogate for actual legislative intent).
158. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 3245, 3250, 3252 (1982) (courts
should give effect to plain meaning of statute notwithstanding litigants' efforts to convince courts
to exercise judicial discretion); Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, supra note 32, at 1121.
159. See supra notes 32-35, 49, 55-57, 85-91, 111-124 & 138-143 (discussion of Turkette,
Moss, and Schacht).
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